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Developing countries frequently face large adverse shocks to their economies. We
study two distinct types of such shocks: large declines in the price of a country’s
commodity exports and severe natural disasters. Unsurprisingly, adverse shocks
reduce the short-term growth of constant-price GDP and we analyse which structural
policies help to minimize these losses. Structural policies are incentives and regula-
tions that are maintained for long periods, contrasting with policy responses to shocks,
the analysis of which has dominated the literature. We show that some previously
neglected structural policies have large effects that are specific to particular types of
shock. In particular, regulations which reduce the speed of firm exit substantially
increase the short-term growth loss from adverse non-agricultural export price
shocks and so are particularly ill-suited to mineral exporting economies. Natural dis-
asters appear to be better accommodated by labour market policies, perhaps because
such shocks directly dislocate the population.
JEL classifications: O47, Q38, Q54.
1. Introduction
Global commodity prices are highly volatile and this makes commodity exporters
shock-prone. The analysis of economic policies appropriate for such economies
has focused predominantly upon government responses to windfalls: notably, how
should it adjust public spending and the exchange rate? In contrast, our focus
is upon structural policies, typically maintained for long periods, that affect the
ability of private actors to respond to shocks through regulation. Rather than
windfalls we consider adverse shocks. With the current sharp and unanticipated
decline in commodity prices it is appropriate to consider the adoption of structural
policies that might better enable the economies of commodity-exporting countries
to cope.
In principle, it should be far easier for a government to get structural policies
right than to get policy responses right. Response requires that a government be
! Oxford University Press 2009
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 fleet of foot, and may also require it to make a correct assessment as to how
the shock will evolve. In contrast, appropriate structural policies do not need to
be adopted in haste: a government that recognizes that its economy is prone to
shocks can gradually put in place such policies, as precautionary and subsequent
governments can maintain this legacy without further action.
In this paper we empirically investigate the role of structural policies in mitigat-
ing the growth loss from adverse shocks. In addition to commodity export price
shocks, we also consider large natural disasters. Using data for around 130 coun-
tries from 1964 till 2003, we find that adverse commodity export price shocks
and natural disasters matter substantially for short-term growth. We do not find
evidence of a long run effect of commodity export price shocks (volatility) on
the level of GDP. We investigate the efficacy of a range of structural policies
in mitigating the negative short-term growth effects from shocks. Our results
show that regulations that delay the speed of firm closure significantly and sub-
stantially increase the short-term growth loss from adverse price shocks in com-
modity-exporting countries. In the case of natural disasters, on the other hand,
the negative effect on short-term growth is increased by labour market regulations
that prevent an efficient re-allocation of workers. Our results are robust to alterna-
tive specifications and shock measures, as well as the inclusion of an extensive range
of control variables for other regulations, other policies, and institutional quality.
1
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss our methodology and
our data. Section 3 presents our core results and Section 4 tests their robustness.
Section 5 concludes.
2. Methodology and data
Our estimation strategy involves two steps. We first test the effects of adverse
shocks on growth. Having established their adverse effects, we then investigate
the consequences of various structural policies in mitigating the losses.
2.1 Measuring shocks
The first step is to construct a measure of adverse shocks. We consider two distinct
types of shock: large declines in the price of a country’s commodity exports, and
severe natural disasters.
We use the commodity export price index of Collier and Goderis (2008) to
construct measures of commodity export price shocks.
2 The index was constructed
using the methodology of Deaton and Miller (1995) and Dehn (2000). We collected
data on world commodity prices and commodity export values for as many
commodities as data availability allowed. Table 1b lists the 50 commodities in
..........................................................................................................................................................................
1This paper is related to the literature on terms-of-trade shocks and growth. Recent contributions
include Broda (2004), Loayza and Raddatz (2007), and Raddatz (2007).
2See Collier and Goderis (2008) for data description and sources.







































































































 our sample. For each country we calculate the total 1990 value of commodity
exports. We construct weights by dividing the individual 1990 export values
for each commodity by this total. These 1990 weights are then held fixed over
time and applied to the world price indices of the same commodities to form
a country-specific geometrically weighted index of commodity export prices.
This index was first constructed on a quarterly basis and deflated by the export
unit value. We then calculate the annual average of the quarterly index (rescaled
so that 1980=100), which yields an annual commodity export price index. Below,
we will use this annual index to construct measures of commodity export price
shocks and commodity export price volatility.
We first construct measures of commodity export price shocks. We define
shocks as episodes with large changes in commodity export prices. In our
core results we follow Collier and Dehn (2001) in removing the predictable
component of shocks. Specifically, we take the first difference of the log of the
annual commodity export price index and then remove its predictable component
by running the following forecasting estimation model:
 Ii,t ¼  0 þ  1t þ  1 Ii,t 1 þ  2 Ii,t 2 þ "i,t ð1Þ
where Ii,t is the log annual commodity export price index and t is a linear
time trend. We collect the residuals "i,t from eq. (1) and calculate the 10
th and
90
th percentile of their distribution. However, our results are not dependent
upon the exclusion of the predictable component. Indeed, the extreme shocks
on which we focus are virtually unpredictable from past price information so
that any such adjustment makes only a negligible difference. Positive and nega-
tive commodity export price shock episodes are defined as the observations
with residuals above the 90
th or below the 10
th percentile, respectively. For robust-
ness we will also estimate the effect of shocks using the 5
th and 95
th percentile as
thresholds. Having identified the shock episodes, we next construct two variables.
The first captures positive commodity export price shocks and equals the first log
difference of the annual commodity export price index for the positive shock
episodes, and zero otherwise. The second captures negative commodity export
price shocks and equals minus the first log difference of the annual commodity
export price index for the negative shock episodes, and zero otherwise. Finally,
to allow the effect of commodity export price shocks to be larger for countries
with larger exports, we weight the two variables by the share of commodity exports
in GDP. Our estimation sample contains 372 positive shock episodes and 392
negative shock episodes. We will use the constructed measures to test the effect
of commodity export price shocks on short run growth.
In addition to any effect of shocks on short run growth, changes in commodity
export prices may also have an effect on growth in the long run. To allow for
this possibility, we also include a measure of export price volatility. In particular,
we construct a variable that captures the pre-1986 mean absolute change in the
log of the annual commodity export price index for the years before 1986 and the







































































































 post-1985 mean absolute change in the log of the annual commodity export price
index for the years after 1985. We then weight this variable by the share of com-
modity exports in GDP to allow the effect of volatility to be proportional to
a country’s exposure and use the weighted measure of volatility to estimate the
effect of commodity export price volatility on the long run level of GDP. For
sensitivity, we constructed an alternative measure of volatility. In particular, we
use the quarterly deflated commodity export price index,
3 and for each quarter
calculate the country-specific standard deviation of this index over the quarter
and the three preceding quarters. This yields a country-specific rolling standard
deviation of commodity export prices. We then use the log of the annual average
of this variable, weighted by the share of commodity exports in GDP, as an
alternative measure of volatility.
As a final commodity export price measure, we use the log of the annual com-
modity export price index, weighted by the 1990 share of commodity exports
in GDP, as a long run control variable. We also include an oil import price
index, which was constructed by interacting the log of the annual average of
a deflated quarterly world oil price index with a dummy variable for net oil
importers.
4
Our indicator of natural disasters captures the total number of geological,
climatic, and human disasters in a year (Raddatz, 2007).
5 We include only
events that qualify as ‘large’ disasters according to the criteria established by
the International Monetary Fund (2003).
6 Our estimation sample contains 683
episodes with one or more large natural disasters.
2.2 Effects of shocks on growth
We analyse the effects of shocks by estimating the error-correction model in eq. (2)
below.
7
 yi,t ¼  i þ  0zi,t þ  yi,t 1 þ  0
1xi,t 1 þ  0


















where the subscripts i=1,...N and t=1,...T index the countries and years
in the panel, respectively. yi,t is log real GDP per capita in constant 2000 US$
..........................................................................................................................................................................
3This is the quarterly index that we constructed prior to calculating its annual average to obtain the
annual commodity export price index.
4See Collier and Goderis (2008) for data description and sources.
5Data are from the WHO Collaborating Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED).
Geological disasters: earthquakes, landslides, volcano eruptions, tidal waves; Climatic disasters: floods,
droughts, extreme temperatures, wind storms; Human disasters: famines, epidemics.
650.5% of population affected or damage 50.5% of GDP or 51 death per 10,000.
7This model is based on Collier and Goderis (2008), who report panel unit root and cointegration tests.







































































































 (World Development Indicators, henceforth WDI) in country i in year t,  i is
a country-specific fixed effect, and zi,t is an rT 1 vector of regional year dummies,
where r is the number of regions.
8 xi,t 1 is an m 1 vector of m variables that
are expected to affect GDP in the long run and in the short run. We include three
control variables from the empirical growth literature: trade openness, measured
as the ratio of trade to GDP (WDI); inflation, measured as the log of one plus
the annual consumer price inflation rate (WDI); and international reserves over
GDP (International Financial Statistics, henceforth IFS, and WDI). li,t 1 is an h 1
vector of h variables that are expected to affect GDP in the long run only.
We include the log of the annual commodity export price index, weighted by
the 1990 share of commodity exports in GDP, as well as the oil import price
index, to control for the long run effects of commodity export and oil import
prices.
9 We also include our indicator of commodity export price volatility.
The vector si,t j consists of n variables that are expected to have only a short-run
effect on growth and includes our measures of commodity export price shocks
and natural disasters.
10 We also include indicators that capture civil war
(Gleditsch, 2004) and the number of coup d’e ´tats.
11
Our key interest is in the vector pi,t j of k indicators of policies that could
potentially mitigate the adverse growth effects of commodity export price
shocks and natural disasters. Some of these structural policies are standard in
the analysis of shocks, notably financial depth, financial openness, remittances,
and international reserves. The key contribution of this paper is to add indicators
that capture the flexibility of labour markets and the flexibility of firm entry
and exit, all based on the Doing Business surveys of the World Bank. The interaction
of si,t j and pi,t j in eq. (2) tests whether these structural policies mitigate
the effects of shocks.
12
Our dataset consists of all countries and years for which data are available,
and covers around 130 countries between 1964 and 2003. Table 1a reports
summary statistics for the variables used in estimation, and Table 1b lists the
commodities in our sample.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
8We include the following regions: Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, East Asia and Pacific
and Oceania, Latin America and Caribbean, North Africa and Middle East, South Asia, Sub-Saharan
Africa, and Western Europe and North-America.
9The short run effect of commodity export prices is captured by the shock variables (see below).
10The price shocks capture large changes in the commodity export price index. We did not find any
significant effect of smaller price changes and therefore did not include the change in the index.
11A coup d’e ´tat is defined as an extra constitutional or forced change in the government elite or its
control of the nation’s power structure (Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive).
12We only include shock-policy interactions for commodity export price shocks and natural disasters,
not for wars and coups.







































































































 Table 1a Summary statistics
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Real GDP per capita (log) 3564 7.54 1.55 4.31 10.55
Trade to GDP 3564 0.65 0.36 0.06 2.51
Inflation (log [1 + inflation rate]) 3564 0.14 0.29  0.24 5.48
Reserves to GDP 3564 0.09 0.10 0.00 1.24
Annual commodity export price index
(1980=100)
3564 81.06 26.80 15.10 230.05
Weighted log annual commodity export
price index
3564 0.34 0.36 0.00 1.97
Commodity exports to GDP 3564 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.45
Commodity export price volatility 3564 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.08
Oil import price index 3564 3.12 1.85 0.00 4.96
  GDP per capita (log) 3564 0.02 0.05  0.36 0.30
  Trade to GDP 3564 0.01 0.08  0.88 1.21
  Inflation (log [1 + inflation rate]) 3564  0.00 0.19  3.62 2.52
  Reserves to GDP 3564 0.00 0.03  0.25 0.31
Coup 3564 0.03 0.17 0 2
Civil war 3564 0.07 0.26 0 1
Flexible exchange rate 2865 0.62 0.49 0 1
Aid (log) 2760 1.44 1.01  0.92 4.38
Flexibility of employment 124 0.47 0.50 0 1
Speed of firm exit 110 0.73 0.17 0 1
Speed of firm entry 122 0.50 0.13 0.19 1
Number Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Positive commodity export price shocks
(unweighted)
372 0.28 0.18  0.03 1.03
Negative commodity export price shocks
(unweighted)
392 0.26 0.13 0.05 0.81
Natural disasters 683 1.32 0.59 1 4
Notes: Our indicators of flexibility of employment and speed of firm exit and entry are based on cross-
sections of average 2004–2007 values for 124, 110, and 122 countries, respectively. We use these average
values for all the years in our sample.
Table 1b Commodities
Non-agricultural Agricultural
aluminum oil bananas fish palmkerneloil sisal tobacco
phosphatrock coal barley maize palmoil sorghum wheat
copper silver butter pepper oliveoil soybeanoil wool
gasoline tin cocoabeans hides plywood soybeans
ironore lead coconutoil jute poultry sugar
uranium urea coffee groundnutoil pulp sunfloweroil
natural gas zinc copra groundnuts rice swinemeat
nickel cotton oranges rubber tea







































































































 3. Estimation results
3.1 Preliminaries
The results of estimating eq. (2) are reported in Table 2. We first simply investigate
whether shocks matter for growth, the interaction effects being introduced later.
The coefficients for commodity export price shocks and natural disasters all
have the expected signs. Negative price shocks lower growth,
13 both in the same
year and in the next, but the effect is much larger and is significant at 1% in the
year after the shock.
14 The size of the coefficient suggests that for countries like
Nigeria and Zambia, where commodity exports represent 35% of GDP, a negative
price shock of 30% lowers growth in the next year by 0.340*0.35*0.30=3.6%
points. Positive price shocks have a positive effect on growth, but the effects are
smaller and the effect in the year after the shock is only significant at 10%. This
asymmetry is not surprising. If the economy is normally close to its productive
capacity then sudden large increases in export earnings cannot rapidly raise aggre-
gate output. In contrast, sudden large decreases will reduce both export output
and demand elsewhere in the economy, and these will rapidly lower aggregate
output unless prices are highly flexible and resources swift to move. The coefficient
for natural disasters is negative and significant at 5%. However, the effect on output
of the typical natural disaster is modest, lowering growth by only 0.36% points.
15
While negative commodity export price shocks significantly lower growth in
the short run, we do not find evidence of a long-run negative effect of commodity
export price volatility on GDP. The indicator of volatility enters with the counter-
intuitive positive sign and the coefficient is far from significant.
16
We next turn to the other variables in Table 2. The long-run coefficients
for trade openness, inflation, and international reserves have the expected signs
and are significant. The long-run effect of commodity export prices is negative and
significant, which is consistent with the ‘resource curse’ finding in Collier and
Goderis (2008). The long run effect of higher oil prices on oil importing countries
is negative but insignificant. The short-run adjustment coefficient is highly signifi-
cant and suggests a speed of adjustment of around 6% per year. The other short-
run coefficients all have the expected signs but are sometimes insignificant. The
lagged dependent variable enters positive and significant at 1%, while coups and
civil wars have unsurprisingly large adverse effects on growth.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
13Since our dependent variable is the change in log constant-price GDP per capita, it is not directly
affected by changes in export prices.
14We experimented with additional lags and squared terms but they proved to be unimportant.
15In all tables, we multiply the coefficients for natural disasters by 10 to make them more informative
(compare  0.036 with  0.004). The coefficient in Table 2 ( 0.036) thus corresponds to a growth loss of
0.10*0.036=0.36% points.
16We tested the robustness of this result using our alternative measure of volatility. The long run
coefficient was again positive and insignificant.







































































































 Table 2 Estimation results cointegration model
Long-run coefficients
Trade to GDP 0.475***
(0.135)
Inflation (log)  0.186**
(0.077)
Reserves to GDP 0.696***
(0.252)
Commodity export price index  1.009***
(0.339)
Oil import price index  0.106
(0.082)
Commodity export price volatility 2.237
(4.419)
Short-run adjustment coefficient
GDP per capita (log)t-1  0.062***
(0.008)
Short-run coefficients
  Trade to GDPt-1 0.017
(0.015)
  Inflation (log)t-1  0.003
(0.004)
  Reserves to GDPt-1 0.050
(0.035)




Civil wart  0.022***
(0.005)
Positive price shockt 0.044
(0.084)
Positive price shockt-1 0.091*
(0.052)
Negative price shockt  0.060
(0.062)
Negative price shockt-1  0.340***
(0.102)
Natural disastert  0.036**
(0.015)
Number of observations 3564
R-squared within 0.26
Number of countries 129
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-differenced log of real GDP per capita in year t. All regressions
include country fixed effects and regional time dummies. Robust standard errors are clustered by
country and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. The long-run coefficients correspond to  ð1= Þ  1 and  ð1= Þ  2 in eq. (2).







































































































 3.2 Shocks and policies
Having established that both negative commodity export price shocks and
natural disasters have significant adverse growth effects, we now investigate alter-
native policies that could mitigate these effects. We first considered financial
depth, financial openness, international reserves, and remittances but did not
find any significant shock-mitigating effect of these policies.
17
Governments control an array of policies that affect the functioning of labour
markets. Because employment is politically sensitive, there is a wide range in
the degree to which governments regulate labour markets, permitting flexibility.
We might expect that the ability of economic actors to respond to shocks is
influenced by regulatory restrictions on hiring and firing. In countries with more
flexible labour markets, labour can more easily be reallocated from sectors or
regions that are hit by the shock.
We investigate the importance of labour market flexibility using indices of
employment flexibility that were calculated from data of the Doing Business surveys
of the World Bank (World Bank, 2007). The Doing Business project started in
2004 and provides measures of business regulations and their enforcement across
178 countries. Part of the project focuses on the regulation of employment and
includes a composite index of ‘rigidity of employment’, which is the average
of three sub-indices: a difficulty of hiring index, a rigidity of hours index, and
a difficulty of firing index. All indices have ordinal scales. Our composite
measure of employment flexibility is a dummy variable that takes a value of one
for all years if a country’s average value of the ‘rigidity of employment’ index
between 2004 and 2007 is below its median value for all countries and zero if
it is above its median value.
In addition to the regulation of employment, Doing Business also studies the
regulation of firm exit and entry. This involves all procedures that entrepreneurs
have to follow in order to close down or start up a business. Since the ability of an
economy to reallocate capital and labour after a shock is likely to depend on the
flexibility of entrepreneurs to close down businesses, we specifically investigate
whether the flexibility of firm exit mitigates the adverse effects of shocks.
Our measure of speed of firm exit is based on the average 2004–2007 value of
the variable ‘time to close a business’ in Doing Business, which we rescaled to
range from zero to one, with higher values indicating a higher speed of firm
exit.
18 The time to close a business is calculated for a limited liability company
..........................................................................................................................................................................
17To save space, we do not discuss these estimation results. Full results are available in the working
paper version of this paper (CSAE Working Paper No. 2009-03, Department of Economics, University of
Oxford).
18In contrast to the ordinal indicators of labour market flexibility, the indicator ‘time to close a business’
has a cardinal scale. We therefore did not turn it into a dummy but constructed a continuous indicator
of the speed of firm exit.







































































































 in the country’s most populous city, which has a hotel as its major asset and
employs 201 employees. It varies between five months and 10 years.
We first test whether employment flexibility and speed of firm exit mitigate
the negative growth effects of adverse commodity export price shocks.
19 In
Table 3, we add interactions of the indicators of each of these flexibility measures
with each of the four commodity export price shocks to the specification
of Table 2.
20 The lagged negative price shock again enters negative and the coeffi-
cient is significant at 1%, indicating that a country without shock cushioning
policies suffers a significant growth loss. However, the interaction of the shock
with our speed of firm exit indicator enters positive and is significant at 5%,
suggesting that countries with faster bankruptcy procedures suffer significantly
less from export price shocks. The effect is big. For a country like Indonesia,
with commodity exports of 15% of GDP, a relatively low speed of firm exit
of 0.45 (5
th percentile of the sample distribution), and a value of zero for the
employment flexibility dummy, a negative price shock of 30% lowers growth in
the next year by around 2.61% points. If Indonesia were to increase its speed
of firm exit to the 95
th percentile of the sample distribution (0.95), this growth
loss would fall from 2.61% points to 0.49% points. These results suggest that
the speed of bankruptcy procedures is very important for the ability of countries
to cope with adverse commodity export price shocks.
Although the procedures for closing a business will often extend beyond the
growth impact of a shock, we might indeed expect the speed with which they
can be completed to be important. One reason is that adverse shocks can lead
to a severe reduction in lending. Such liquidity problems are much more likely
to occur in countries with lengthy and disorderly bankruptcy procedures. If inves-
tors face years of litigation and uncertainty, they will be much less inclined to
provide new loans and in the worst case a country’s liquidity will fully dry up.
A second potential transmission mechanism is that if the supply of entrepreneur-
ship is limited, the inability of entrepreneurs to exit activities where business
has deteriorated will slow the pace at which new opportunities are taken up.
The coefficient of the interaction of the lagged negative price shock with
the employment flexibility indicator is highly insignificant, indicating that, in
contrast to the flexibility of firm exit, labour market flexibility does not reduce
the growth loss from adverse price shocks.
21 The coefficients of the other variables
in Table 3 are similar to the coefficients in Table 2. Perhaps, as with financial
..........................................................................................................................................................................
19The correlation between our indicators of employment flexibility and speed of firm exit is 0.11.
20We do not add the flexibility measures by themselves as they are time invariant and are therefore
captured by the fixed effects.
21As part of our sensitivity analysis in Section 4, we test the robustness of this finding using an alterna-
tive labour market flexibility indicator from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness
Report. We find the same result.







































































































 Table 3 The effect of negative commodity export price shocks
Long-run coefficients
Trade to GDP 0.590***
(0.152)
Inflation (log)  0.219***
(0.075)
Reserves to GDP 0.978***
(0.253)
Commodity export price index  0.773*
(0.415)
Oil import price index  0.076
(0.086)
Commodity export price volatility  1.722
(4.465)
Short-run adjustment coefficient
GDP per capita (log)t-1  0.061***
(0.009)
Short-run coefficients
  Trade to GDPt-1 0.015
(0.018)
  Inflation (log)t-1  0.002
(0.004)
  Reserves to GDPt-1 0.064*
(0.036)




Civil wart  0.017***
(0.005)
Natural disastert  0.038**
(0.017)
Positive price shockt 0.425
(0.426)
Positive price shockt*flex. of employment 0.127
(0.125)
Positive price shockt*speed of firm exit  0.521
(0.575)
Positive price shockt-1 0.131
(0.336)
Positive price shockt-1*flex. of employment  0.082
(0.177)
Positive price shockt-1*speed of firm exit  0.052
(0.539)
Negative price shockt  0.096
(0.274)
(continued)







































































































 depth, labour market flexibility might have offsetting effects, facilitating resource
reallocation but amplifying the initial demand shock as workers lose their jobs.
Having established that the speed of firm exit mitigates the adverse effect of
commodity price shocks, we next investigate whether it also mitigates the adverse
effect of natural disasters. In Table 4, we add interactions of the indicators of
employment flexibility and speed of firm exit with the natural disaster variable
to the specification of Table 2. The natural disaster variable enters with a negative
sign and is significant at 5%, indicating that a country without shock cushioning
policies suffers a significant growth loss. The coefficient of the interaction between
the natural disaster variable and the speed of firm exit indicator is again positive
but is insignificant. Recall that natural disasters typically have far smaller adverse
effects on output than do large export price shocks, so that the lack of significance
may simply be because the interaction effect is too small to detect. This explanation
is, however, qualified by the interaction between the natural disaster variable and
the flexibility of employment indicator which enters positive and significant at 1%.
Labour market flexibility cushions the effects of natural disasters and the effect is
substantial. While the average natural disaster lowers growth by 1.29% points in
countries with no mitigating policies, this growth loss is only 0.15% points in
countries with a flexible labour market. There may therefore be a genuine difference
between the effects of the policies on export shocks and natural disasters. Disasters
are physical shocks that typically hit in rural areas, forcing the mass relocation of
people. They may therefore place a relatively large burden on the labour market,
with flexibility enabling people who have been relocated to find new employment.
Table 3 Continued
Short-run coefficients
Negative price shockt*flex. of employment  0.154
(0.127)
Negative price shockt*speed of firm exit 0.167
(0.439)
Negative price shockt-1  1.003***
(0.369)
Negative price shockt-1*flex. of employment 0.107
(0.115)
Negative price shockt-1*speed of firm exit 0.941**
(0.438)
Number of observations 3156
R-squared within 0.30
Number of countries 110
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-differenced log of real GDP per capita in year t. All regressions
include country fixed effects and regional time dummies. Robust standard errors are clustered by
country and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. The long-run coefficients correspond to  ð1= Þ  1 and  ð1= Þ  2 in eq. (2).







































































































 Table 4 The effect of natural disasters
Long-run coefficients
Trade to GDP 0.578***
(0.147)
Inflation (log)  0.212***
(0.075)
Reserves to GDP 1.052***
(0.253)
Commodity export price index  0.798*
(0.410)
Oil import price index  0.082
(0.085)
Commodity export price volatility  1.626
(4.230)
Short-run adjustment coefficient
GDP per capita (log)t-1  0.062***
(0.009)
Short-run coefficients
  Trade to GDPt-1 0.018
(0.018)
  Inflation (log)t-1  0.002
(0.005)
  Reserves to GDPt-1 0.059
(0.037)




Civil wart  0.017***
(0.005)
Positive price shockt 0.114
(0.082)
Positive price shockt-1 0.070
(0.066)
Negative price shockt  0.042
(0.062)
Negative price shockt-1  0.306***
(0.113)
Natural disastert  0.129**
(0.064)
Natural disastert*flex. of employment 0.114***
(0.028)
Natural disastert*speed of firm exit 0.048
(0.079)
Number of observations 3156
R-squared within 0.30
Number of countries 110
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-differenced log of real GDP per capita in year t. All regressions
include country fixed effects and regional time dummies. Robust standard errors are clustered
by country and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and







































































































 In contrast, since businesses are overwhelmingly urban, they may only be lightly
affected by natural disasters, whereas export shocks are exclusively monetary and
so inevitably hit them.
4. Sensitivity and endogeneity
We now investigate the sensitivity of our results to alternative specifications.
We first consider our finding that speed of firm exit mitigates adverse export
price shocks.
4.1 Adverse commodity export price shocks
As a first check, we re-estimate the specification of Table 3 without the interactions
of the price shocks with employment flexibility. The results are reported in Table 5,
column (1). To save space, we only report the coefficients and standard errors
of the variables of interest.
22 The lagged adverse price shock again enters with
a negative sign and remains significant at 5%. The interaction of the shock with
speed of firm exit again enters positive and is significant at 5%.
A possible concern with these estimation results is that the explanatory
variables are endogenous. Endogeneity could relate to the shocks, the policies, or
both. Adverse commodity export price shocks may be endogenous to the extent
that some exporters may have an influence over the world price of the commodities
that they export. To address this concern, we express each country’s exports of
a given commodity as a share of the total world exports of that commodity
and repeat this for all other commodities in our sample. This yields a list of
export shares that reflect the importance of individual exporters in the global
markets for individual commodities. We found that of the 129 countries in our
sample, 22 countries export at least one commodity for which their share in
world exports exceeds 20%. We investigate whether the inclusion of these
major exporters affected our results by re-estimating the specification in Table 5,
column (1), without these 22 countries. Our findings are strongly robust. In fact,
the coefficients for the shock and the interaction of the shock with the speed
of firm exit, gain in terms of size and significance. This shows that our results
are not affected by the large exporters in our sample and hence supports the
assumption of exogeneity. More generally, it is difficult to see how a large decline
in export prices could be induced by a decline in aggregate output in exporting
countries.
Another possible source of endogeneity is the policy variables. If a country’s
speed of firm exit is correlated with other (omitted) structural characteristics or
..........................................................................................................................................................................
22Full results are available in the working paper version (CSAE Working Paper No. 2009-03,
Department of Economics, University of Oxford).












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 policies that mitigate shocks, then we might wrongfully attribute the mitigating
effects to the speed of firm exit. To address this problem, we performed a range of
robustness checks. First, we re-estimated the specification of Table 5, column (1),
but including interactions of the price shock variables with each of the other
35 Doing Business indicators separately.
23 The results for all the 35 regressions
together suggest that it is really the speed of firm exit that is important in mitigating
the growth loss from adverse commodity price shocks and not any other Doing
Business indicator.
24 Table 5, column (2), shows the results for the specification
in which we add an interaction of the shock variable with a speed of firm entry
indicator, based on the time to start a business.
In addition to the characteristics captured by the Doing Business indicators,
our results may also be explained by other institutional characteristics or policies
that may mitigate shocks. To investigate this possibility, we collected 12 indicators
of governance quality and again re-estimated the specification of Table 5, column
(1), but this time including interactions of the shock variables with each of the
governance indicators separately.
25
We do not find a mitigating effect of institutions on the impact of shocks
on growth. Also, controlling for any effect that institutions may have does not
..........................................................................................................................................................................
23Doing Business captures regulation in ten areas. In addition to ‘Employing Workers’ and ‘Closing a
Business’, the indicators of which we already use, these areas are ‘Starting a Business’, ‘Dealing with
Construction Permits’, ‘Registering Property’, ‘Getting Credit’, ‘Protecting Investors’, ‘Paying Taxes’,
‘Trading Across Borders’, and ‘Enforcing Contracts’. For each indicator, we calculate the average 2004–
2007 value and then rescale this average so that it ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values corresponding
to more flexibility. We express indicators with an ordinal scale as dummies that for all years take a value
of one (zero) if the country-specific average level of flexibility over all available years is above (below) the
median of all countries.
24The lagged adverse price shock always enters with a negative sign and the significance level of the
coefficient is relatively robust: 1% in 21 specifications, 5% in 11 specifications, 10% in two specifica-
tions, and insignificant in one specification. The coefficient of the interaction between the shock and the
speed of firm exit is always positive and the significance level of the coefficient is also relatively robust:
1% in nine specifications, 5% in 25 specifications, and insignificant in one specification. The coefficients
of the interactions between the shock and the other Doing Business indicators are insignificant in 25
specifications, significant at 10% in five specifications, significant at 5% in four specifications, and
significant (but with the ‘wrong’ sign) at 1% in one specification. In the specification where the inter-
action with speed of firm exit is (just) insignificant, the coefficient is still negative and only slightly
smaller in size. Moreover, the interaction with the other Doing Business indicator is small positive and far
from significant.
25The 12 governance indicators are: voice and accountability, political stability, government effective-
ness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (all from Kaufmann et al., 2008), and civil
liberties (Freedom House), political rights (Freedom House), political constraints (polconv, Henisz,
2002), democracy (Polity IV), autocracy (Polity IV), and checks and balances (Database of Political
Institutions). All indicators are introduced as dummies that for all sample years take a value of one if the
country-specific average level of institutional quality over all available years is above the median of all
countries and zero otherwise.







































































































 change our finding that countries with more flexible firm exit procedures suffer less
from adverse price shocks.
26
As a final robustness check to address potential omitted variable bias, we con-
sider two policies that have already been shown to effectively mitigate the growth
effect of adverse price shocks: exchange rate flexibility (Broda, 2004) and aid
(Collier and Goderis, 2009). We next add our indicators of exchange rate flexibility
and aid to the specification of Table 5, column (1),
27 both individually and inter-
acted with each of the four price shocks.
28 The results are reported in Table 5,
column (3). Although the interactions of the lagged price shock with exchange rate
flexibility and aid enter with the expected sign, neither coefficient is significant. The
coefficients of the lagged price shock and the interaction of the shock with speed of
firm exit, on the other hand, gain in terms of size and significance.
The results above show that it is the specific indicator of the speed of firm exit
which is important, as opposed to the many other aspects of the business envir-
onment, policies, and institutional quality.
Having addressed endogeneity, we next investigate whether our results are robust
to alternative shock measures. Recall that our commodity export price shock epi-
sodes were defined as the observations with residuals above the 90
th or below the
10
th percentile in the specification of eq. (1). For sensitivity, we change these
thresholds to the 95
th and the 5
th percentile, which reduces the number of shock
episodes. Using this alternative measure of shocks, we re-estimate the specification
in Table 5, column (1). The results, reported in Table 5, column (4), show that the
estimated coefficients are strongly robust and even gain in size and significance.
As a second robustness check, we reconstruct the commodity export price shocks
using a different criterion to identify shock episodes. Instead of using eq. (1) to
remove the predictable component of shocks, we now simply define shock episodes
as the observations for which the first difference of the log annual commodity
export price index either lies above the 90
th percentile of its distribution (positive
shocks) or below the 10
th percentile (negative shocks). The results, reported in
Table 5, column (5), show that our findings are robust.
We next investigate whether the effects vary across different types of shocks. We
distinguish between non-agricultural price shocks and agricultural price shocks,
and construct measures for each of these, using the methodology described in
Section 2.1. We also construct interactions of both of these measures with the
..........................................................................................................................................................................
26In all 12 specifications, the coefficient of the lagged adverse price shock is negative and significant at
1%. The coefficient of the interaction between the shock and the speed of firm exit is always positive and
is significant at 1% in four specifications and at 5% in eight specifications. Finally, the coefficients of the
interactions between the shock and the institutional indicators are insignificant in eight specifications
and significant at 10% in four specifications.
27For exchange rate flexibility, we use a dummy based on Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), which takes a
value of zero for course classification code=1, and one for all other categories. For aid, we use official
development assistance (% of GNI) from OECD IDS.
28Since aid is endogenous, we use IV estimation (see Collier and Goderis, 2009).







































































































 speed of firm exit indicator. We replace the shock and its interaction with speed
of firm exit in Table 5, column (1), by the two separate shock measures and
their interactions with speed of firm exit and rerun the specification. The results
are reported in Table 5, column (6). The non-agricultural price shock enters with
a negative sign and its coefficient is significant at 1%. The interaction of non-
agricultural price shocks with the speed of firm exit has a positive sign and
is significant at 1%. Hence, the results for non-agricultural shocks are entirely
consistent with the results we found for the general commodity export price
shocks. By contrast, the agricultural price shock and its interaction with speed of
firm exit have the opposite signs, while their coefficients are far from significant.
This indicates that our findings were driven by the non-agricultural export
price shocks.
Two distinctions between the revenues from the extractive sector and those
from the agricultural sector might account for this difference. One is that in the
former, sizeable revenues accrue to the government whereas in the latter revenues
accrue predominantly to farmer households. The difference in the consequences
of shocks for growth may therefore be because farm households are more adept
at cushioning spending in response to shocks than are governments. In this
case the rest of the economy has less need to adjust so that the speed of firm
exit might not show up as important. A second evident difference is that the
rural economy is largely informal. As a result, the regulatory regime would not
matter because it is not enforced in the rural economy. A further implication of
rural informality might be that shocks within it are well-absorbed by price and
employment flexibility, mitigating the effects on the formal economy. In contrast,
extractive shocks accrue to the formal economy, directly hitting the government
and extractive companies, and having knock-on effects for their suppliers.
Evidently, it is the formal economy which would be most affected by regulations
on firm exit.
As four final robustness checks, we experiment with alternative sets of controls.
We first transform the model in Table 5, column (1), into an autoregressive dis-
tributed lag model by removing the long-run GDP determinants and the lagged
level of GDP per capita. The results from estimating this model are reported in
Table 5, column (7). Our results are robust. We then strip the specification in
Table 5, column (1), three more times. First, we remove all insignificant controls
(results in Table 5, column 8). Secondly, we drop the trade openness variables
(results in Table 5, column 9). And finally, we drop the lagged dependent variable
(results in Table 5, column 10). In all cases, the results are robust.
29
..........................................................................................................................................................................
29We also tested the robustness of our findings to employing cross-sectional OLS estimation. We find
no significant effect of commodity export price volatility (the country-specific standard deviation of the
price index) on average GDP growth. However, we do find that the volatility of prices significantly
increases the volatility of growth. We also find that this effect is significantly smaller in countries with
higher speeds of firm exit. These results are consistent with our panel data findings, which show that
negative export price shocks lead to lower short run growth but that shocks do not have an effect on







































































































 4.2 Natural disasters
We next consider the robustness of our finding that labour market flexibility
cushions the adverse effect of natural disasters. As a first check, we re-estimate
the specification of Table 4 without the interaction of the natural disaster indicator
with the indicator of speed of firm exit. The results are reported in Table 6,
column (1). The coefficients of the natural disaster variable and its interaction
with employment flexibility are now both significant at 1%, although smaller
in size.
To allow for the possibility that the effects vary across different types of
natural disasters, we replace the total number of disasters and its interaction
with employment flexibility in Table 6, column (1), by three separate variables
that capture the number of geological, climatic, and humanitarian disasters and
interactions of each of these with employment flexibility. The results are reported
in Table 6, column (2). The indicator of geological shocks enters with a negative
sign and is significant at 10%, while its interaction with the flexibility of employ-
ment has a positive but insignificant coefficient. The size of both coefficients is
larger than the size of the coefficients in column (1), suggesting that the results
for geological shocks, although less significant, are consistent with the general
effects found in column (1) or even slightly stronger. The coefficients for climatic
shocks are almost identical to the ones in column (1), both in terms of size and
significance, suggesting that our findings for natural disasters are predominantly
driven by climatic shocks. By contrast, the indicator of humanitarian disasters
and its interaction with employment flexibility enter with signs opposite to
the signs of the coefficients in column (1), while their coefficients are not
significant.
Again, the results should be interpreted with caution, as the coefficients may
suffer from endogeneity. As before, endogeneity could relate to the shocks, the
policies, or both. Natural disasters may for example occur more often in countries
with particular geographical characteristics that could also affect growth. However,
since our estimation model includes fixed effects, we effectively control for all
time invariant growth determinants, including geography. Hence, our indicator
of natural disasters is not likely to suffer from endogeneity.
To address the possible endogeneity of the policy variables, we first repeat
the robustness exercises of the previous subsection and separately add the other
Doing Business indicators, institutional indicators, and exchange rate flexibility
and aid to the specification of Table 6, column (1). We do not find evidence
that our results are explained by a correlation between flexibility of employment
..........................................................................................................................................................................
long run GDP, and that the short run effect of shocks is smaller in countries with more flexible
bankruptcy procedures. An additional finding from the cross-sectional analysis is that both the speed
of firm exit and the flexibility of employment have a positive direct effect on average growth, although
not significant.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 and any of these variables (results for exchange rate flexibility and aid reported
in Table 6, column 3).
30
We also test the robustness of our results by replacing the indicator of the
number of natural disasters by a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a
country has one or more disasters in a given year, and zero otherwise. The results,
reported in Table 6, column (4), show that our results are robust.
So far we have used the labour market flexibility indicator from the World
Bank’s Doing Business database. To further investigate whether flexibility indeed
matters, we also tested the robustness of our findings to using an indicator
from a different source. In particular, we collected data on the flexibility of wage
determination, and hiring and firing practices from the World Economic Forum’s
(WEF) Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) 2008/2009 (World Economic
Forum, 2008). The GCR data are based on a worldwide executive survey and
provide measures of de facto labour market flexibility, whereas the Doing
Business indicators capture de jure labour market flexibility.
Using the GCR variables 7.02 (‘Flexibility of Wage Determination’) and 7.05
(‘Hiring and Firing Practices’), we construct a composite measure of flexibility
of employment in the following way. We first normalize the two variables so
that they range from 0 to 1 and rescale them so that a higher value corresponds
to a more flexible labour market (so as to ease comparison to the original results).
We then use the average of the two normalized and rescaled variables in our
estimations.
31 The correlation between this measure of employment flexibility
and the employment flexibility indicator based on Doing Business is 0.41. This
relatively low correlation is consistent with the findings in Chor and Freeman
(2004) for an alternative de facto indicator of flexibility. They suggest that the
low correlation presumably reflects the divergence between regulations and
implementation.
Using the alternative indicator of employment flexibility based on the GCR,
we re-estimate all specifications that included the natural disaster variable and
..........................................................................................................................................................................
30In the specifications for the 35 other Doing Business indicators, the natural disaster variable enters
negative and significant at 1% in six specifications, negative and significant at 5% in 10 specifications,
negative and significant at 10% in six specifications, and insignificant in 13 specifications. The coeffi-
cient of the interaction of the natural disaster variable with the flexibility of employment indicator is
always positive and the significance level of the coefficient is robust: 1% in 29 specifications and 5% in
six specifications. The coefficients of the interactions between the natural disaster variable and the other
Doing Business indicators are insignificant in 31 specifications, while significant at 10% in two specifica-
tions and significant at 5% in two specifications. In the specifications for the 12 indicators of institu-
tional quality, the natural disaster variable always enters with a negative sign, while the significance level
of the coefficient is robust: 1% in seven specifications and 5% in five specifications. The coefficient of the
interaction of the natural disaster variable with the flexibility of employment indicator is always positive,
while the coefficient is always significant at 1%. The coefficients of the interactions between the natural
disaster variable and the institutional indicators are never significant.
31Doing Business constructs its composite measure of rigidity of employment in a similar way. While the
Doing Business indicators have an ordinal scale, the GCR data have a cardinal scale and so we do not
introduce them as dummies.







































































































 the labour market flexibility measure based on Doing Business. Our findings are
strongly robust to using the indicator based on the GCR. The natural disaster
variable always enters with a negative sign and is always significant at 1%. The
interaction of the shock with employment flexibility always enters with a positive
sign and is significant at 5% in six specifications, while significant at 1% in two
specifications. The size of the coefficients for both the natural disaster variable
and its interaction with flexibility is considerably larger than before, suggesting
that our original estimates may represent a lower bound on the true effects. For
the specification of Table 6, column (1), the results of this exercise are reported
in Table 6, column (5).
32
We also investigated the sensitivity of our results to using the continuous
employment flexibility indicator (based on Doing Business) instead of the dummies
we have used so far. We again re-estimate all specifications that included natural
disasters and labour market flexibility but we now replaced the flexibility dummy
by its corresponding continuous variable. Our results are robust in terms of sig-
nificance and the size of the coefficients again increases.
33 For the specification of
Table 6, column (1), the results of this exercise are reported in Table 6, column (6).
Finally, in Table 6, columns (7) to (10), we again experiment with alternative
sets of controls. In column (7) we remove the long-run GDP determinants and
the lagged level of GDP per capita, while in columns (8) to (10) we remove
all insignificant controls, trade openness, and the lagged dependent variable,
respectively. The results are robust.
5. Conclusions
At a time when the volatility and unpredictability of commodity prices has
been dramatically demonstrated, it is appropriate to consider the consequences
of large and unanticipated price declines. We have focused on structural policies
that are well-suited to mitigating such adverse shocks. The advantage of structural
policies is that they do not depend upon a government responding in a timely
and appropriate manner to a price deterioration. Actual responses may fall far
short of the ideal both because policy change is a slow process, and because
determining at the onset of a price shock its likely scale and duration may be
infeasible. In contrast, structural policies can be put in place at any time prior
to an adverse shock and then simply left alone.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
32The coefficient of the interaction term is bigger than the coefficient of the shock by itself. However,
given that the flexibility of employment indicator ranges from 0.37 to 0.81 for the countries in this
estimation sample, the net growth effect of natural disasters ranges from  1.2% points (significant at
1%) for a country with the least flexible labour market to 0.2% points (insignificant, p-value = 0.45) for
countries with the most flexible labour market. The latter effect is far from significant and close to zero.
33The natural disaster variable always enters with a negative sign and is significant at 1% in all eight
specifications. The interaction of the shock with employment flexibility always enters with a positive sign
and is significant at 1% in six specifications and at 5% in two specifications.







































































































 We have investigated the efficacy of a range of structural policies. Some
policies, notably financial depth and openness, despite having received much
emphasis in the policy literature, appear not to have significant net effects. In
contrast, we find that some regulatory policies which have been neglected
appear to have large effects which differ according to the type of shock. We
have distinguished between adverse price shocks to mineral exporters and those
to agricultural exporters, compared these adverse price shocks to positive price
shocks, and finally compared price shocks to natural disasters.
We find that regulations that delay the speed of firm closure, significantly and
substantially increase the short-term growth loss from adverse price shocks in
mineral-exporting countries and that if those delays are severe the growth loss
from such shocks is typically very substantial. We have suggested that delays
in firm exit may amplify the short-term growth loss from a shock by impeding
credit and locking up scarce entrepreneurship. In contrast, adverse agricultural
price shocks do not generate significant losses and regulations that delay firm
exit are of no consequence for shock mitigation. We have suggested that this
may be because rural households are better at smoothing their consumption
than is government, and that the informality of the rural economy facilitates
adjustment and makes regulations irrelevant. Positive price shocks do not typically
generate significant short term increases in real output. Here the explanation for
the asymmetry with negative shocks is likely to be that the economy is normally
operating near its short term production potential. Natural disasters typically
have only relatively small adverse effects on aggregate output. However, the policies
that appear able to mitigate these costs are distinctive. The speed of firm exit
is not significant, but labour market flexibility substantially reduces the short-
term output losses. We have suggested that these distinctive aspects of natural
disasters may be because as predominantly rural phenomena they dislocate
people more than firms.
We have subjected these results to a range of robustness tests. While our under-
lying measures of regulatory policies are too recent to be time-variant, by introdu-
cing an extensive range of controls for other regulations, for other policies, and
for institutional quality, we have addressed reasonable concerns regarding endo-
geneity. Similarly, we have shown that the consequences of commodity price
shocks are robust to concerns that they might be endogenous to supply shocks
in exporting countries.
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